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Abstract
Despite recent intensive research, existing crowdworking systems do not adequately address
all the requirements of a real-world crowdworking environment. First, crowdworking plat-
forms need to integrate within society and in particular to interface with legal and social
institutions. Global regulations must be enforced, such as minimal and maximal work hours
that participants can spend on crowdworking platforms. Second, crowdworking platforms
are naturally distributed and need to collaborate with each other to process complex tasks,
resulting in the rise of multi-platform crowdworking systems. Moreover, while collaborating
to enforce global regulations or while processing complex tasks that require the transpar-
ent sharing of information about the tasks, the system needs to preserve the privacy of
all participants. In this paper, we present SEPAR, a multi-platform crowdworking system
that enforces global constraints on distributed independent entities. In SEPAR, Privacy
is ensured using lightweight and anonymous tokens, while transparency is achieved using a
permissioned blockchain shared across multiple platforms. To support fault tolerance and
support collaboration among platforms, SEPAR provides a suite of distributed consensus
protocols. The privacy guarantees of SEPAR against covert adversaries are formalized and
thoroughly demonstrated, and the experiments reveal the efficiency of SEPAR in terms of
performance and scalability.
1 Introduction
The rise of the platform economy [17, 20] is reshaping work all around the world. Crowdsourcing platforms
dedicated to work (also called crowdworking platforms [8]) are online intermediaries between requesters and
workers, where requesters propose tasks while workers propose skills and time. By providing requesters
(resp. workers) 24/7 access to a worldwide workforce (resp. worlwide task market), crowdworking platforms
have grown in numbers, diversity, and adoption1. Today, crowdworkers come from countries spread all over
the world, and work on several, possibly competing, platforms [8]. The use of crowdworking platforms is
expected to continue growing [31], and in fact they are envisioned as key technological components of the
future of work [32].
Crowdworking platforms, however, challenge national boundaries, weaken the formal relationships between
workers and requesters, and are often not considered legal as employers. Guaranteeing the compliance of
crowdworking platforms with national or regional labour laws is hard2 [31] despite the stringent need for
1See for example : Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/), Wirk (https://www.wirk.io/), or
Appen (https://appen.com/) for micro-tasks, Uber (https://www.uber.com/) or Lyft (https://www.lyft.com/) for
rides, TaskRabbit (https://www.taskrabbit.com/) for home maintainance, Kicklox (https://www.kicklox.com/)
for collaborative engineering.
2See, e.g., the Otey V Crowdflower class action against a famous microtask platform for "substandard wages and
oppressive working hours" (https://casetext.com/case/otey-v-crowdflower-1).
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regulating work. For example, the preamble of the 1919 constitution of the International Labour Organ-
ization [30], written in the ruins of World War I, states that: “Whereas universal and lasting peace can
be established only if it is based upon social justice; (. . . ) an improvement of those conditions is urgently
required; as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum
working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply (. . . )”. The global regulation of the work hours
represents the minimal and maximal number of hours that participants, i.e., worker, requester, and platform,
can spend on crowdworking platforms. While legal tools are currently being investigated, e.g., a Universal
Labour Guarantee [31], there is a stringent need for technical tools allowing official institutions to enforce
regulations.
Most current crowdworking platforms are independent of each other. However, the emergence of more
complex tasks and novel requirements for both workers and requesters, on one hand, and the enforcement of
legal regulations, on the other hand, highlights the need for collaboration between crowdworking platforms,
thus resulting in multi-platform crowdworking systems. For example, many drivers work for both Uber and
Lyft concurrently3, while requesters may also request multiple drivers from both Uber and Lyft concurrently.
The observation holds also for microtask platforms [8], where a common combination among workers is
Amazon Mechanical Turk and Prolific, or for on-demand services4. Participants in a crowdworking task may
also behave maliciously or act as adversaries for their benefits, e.g., violate the privacy of participants or
the regulations. Therefore, to check the enforcement of legal regulations in a multi-platform crowdworking
environment, we need to reconcile transparency with privacy. Indeed, while enforcing limits on the hours
of work over several crowdworking platforms requires the transparent sharing of information about the
crowdworking tasks performed by each platform, without any privacy protection measures, this may lead to
out-of-control disclosures about the participants. Transparent and privacy-preserving collaboration between
multiple platforms might also be needed to address complex cross-platform tasks. If a requester submits a
task with a specified number of requested solutions to multiple platforms, the involved platforms need to
collaborate with each other in order to assign workers and provide the specified number of solutions. As
a result, a multi-platform system needs to establish consensus between platforms to enable them either to
enforce legal regulations or to process cross-platform tasks.
In this paper, we present SEPAR, a technical solution to the problem of imposing global constraints on
distributed independent entities in the context of multi-platform crowdworking systems. The problem is
non-trivial because of the complexity of the conjunction of the required properties:
1. Expressibility: The constraints need to be expressed in a simple and non-ambiguous manner.
2. Transparent and Privacy-preserving Constraint Enforcement: Crowdworking platforms
need to share information about the tasks performed without jeopardizing the privacy of participants
in order to allow both the enforcement of the global constraints and the collaborative processing of
cross-platform tasks.
3. Distributed Collaboration: Crowdworking platforms are naturally distributed and need to col-
laborate through distributed consensus algorithms.
SEPAR proposes a privacy-preserving token-based system where global constraints are modeled using light-
weight and anonymous tokens distributed to workers, platforms, and requesters. Our system formally guar-
antees that global constraints are satisfied by construction and limits the information shared among platforms
and participants to the minimum necessary for performing the tasks against adversarial participants acting
as covert adversaries. We extend our token-based system to allow participants to prove to external entities
(e.g., social security agencies) their involvement in crowdworking tasks. The resulting proofs are called cer-
tificates. To provide transparency across multiple platforms, SEPAR proposes a blockchain-based distributed
ledger shared across platforms. Nonetheless, for the sake of privacy and to improve performance, the block-
chain ledger is not maintained by any single platform and each platform maintains only a view of the ledger.
We then design a suite of distributed consensus algorithms across platforms for coping with the concurrency
issues inherent to a multi-platform context and formally prove their correctness. Salient features of SEPAR
include the simplicity of its building blocks (e.g., usual asymetric encryption scheme) and its compatibility
with today’s platforms (e.g., it does not jeopardize their privacy requirements about requesters and workers
for enforcing the regulation).
In a nutshell, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
3For example, ridesharapps.com provides tutorials to help drivers manage apps to optimize their earnings https:
//rideshareapps.com/drive-for-uber-and-lyft-at-the-same-time/.
4See, e.g., https://tinyurl.com/nytgigmult.
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1. A privacy model stating formally the privacy requirements of a multi-platform regulated crowdwork-
ing system based on the well-known simulatability paradigm,
2. A simple language for expressing global constraints, e.g., limits on the number of work hours, and
mapping them to SQL constraints to ensure semantic clarity,
3. SEPAR, a privacy-preserving transparent multi-platform crowdworking system that enforces a given
set of constraints. (1) Privacy is ensured using lightweight and anonymous tokens, while (2) trans-
parency is achieved using a blockchain shared across platforms. The token-based system is extended
to allow participants to prove to external entities their involvement in crowdworking tasks.
4. A suite of distributed consensus protocols for coping with the concurrency issues inherent to a
multi-platform context. , and
5. A formal security analysis and thorough experimental evaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. The technical background and related work are discussed in Section 2.
Section 3 defines the problem that SEPAR addresses. The language for expressing constraints is expressed
in Section 4. The token-based system for enforcing constraints and the extended system for certificates are
designed in Section 5. The blockchain ledger and consensus protocols are presented in Section 6. Section 7
details our thorough experimental evaluation, and finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Relevant Background
In this section we provide the relevant background for SEPAR. This is divided into two parts. First, we
provide some basic background material on group signatures which provide a basic cryptographic approach
for signing collectively while ensuring verifiable anonymity of the individual signers, and blockchains, which
will be used as a basic building block for SEPAR. Second, we present relevant related work from both the
crowdworking and the blockchain literature.
2.1 Relevant Technical Material
Group Signature. A group signature scheme is a signature scheme for groups that respects three main
properties, as defined first in [16]: (1) only members of the group can sign messages, (2) the receiver of the
signature can verify that it is a valid signature of that group, but cannot discover which member of the group
made it, and (3) in case of dispute later on, the signature can be "opened" (with or without the help of the
group members) to reveal the identity of the signer. A common way to enforce the third property is to rely on
a group manager, that can add new members to the group, or revoke the anonymity of a signature. Instances
of such schemes are proposed in [16], but also in [5,11]. In this paper, we use the protocol proposed in [11],
and denote GroupSign(keypriv,p, g,m) the group signature of participant p (with her private key) of group
g, for the message m. The notation Sign(keypriv,p,m) may also be used to refer to a simple asymmetric
signature of the message m by user p (e.g., RSA).
Blockchain. A blockchain is a distributed data structure for recording transactions maintained by several
nodes without a central authority [10]. In a blockchain, transactions are recorded in an append-only data
structure, called Blockchain ledger. Nodes of a blockchain system agree on their shared states across a
large network of untrusted participants. While in a permissionless blockchain system, e.g., Bitcoin [29], the
network is public, and anyone can participate without a specific identity, a permissioned blockchain, e.g.,
Hyperledger Fabric [4], consists of a set of known, identified nodes which might not fully trust each other. The
unique features of blockchain such as transparency, provenance, fault tolerance, and authenticity are used by
many systems to deploy a wide range of distributed applications such as supply chain management [21] and
healthcare [7] in a permissioned settings. In particular and for a crowdworking system, the transparency of
blockchains can be used to check integrity constraints, provenance enables the system to trace how data is
transformed, fault tolerance helps to enhance reliability and availability, and finally, authenticity guarantees
that signatures and transactions are valid.
2.2 Related Work
Enhancing privacy in the context of crowdworking has been addressed by several recent studies with various
kinds of guarantees, from differential privacy [36, 37] to cryptography [25–27], mostly focusing on spatial
crowdsourcing and the use of geolocation to perform assignment. In ZebraLancer [28] and ZKCrowd [38],
blockchains and consensus protocols are also used to add transparency guarantees on top of privacy. However,
all these works consider a single-platform context, with no external constraints, preventing many real-
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life legislation to apply. To the best of our knowledge, SEPAR is the first to support a multi-platform
crowdworking context, with external constraints, transparency, and privacy expectations at the same time.
In the context of blockchains, Hyperledger Fabric [4] ensures the confidentiality of data using Private Data
Collections [1]. Private Data Collections manage confidential data that two or more entities want to keep
private from other entities. Quorum [15] supports public and private transactions and ensures the confiden-
tiality of private transactions using the Zero-knowledge proof technique. In Quorum, however, all public as
well as private transactions are ordered using a single consensus protocol resulting in low throughput.
Providing anonymity as well as untraceability has been addressed by ZCash [19] which is restricted to the
management of crypto-currency issues. Hawk and Raziel [22, 33] manage wider issues, and include general
smart contracts. However, these solutions do not incorporate infrastructures with multiple platforms, nor
implement constraints (let alone anonymized ones). Finally, Solidus [14] proposes to privately manage a
multi-platform banking system, with individual banks managing their own clients, while allowing cross-
platform transactions. While Solidus may be sufficient for banking systems, it does not consider users that
subscribe to multiple platforms, nor envisions global profiles or constraints.
3 Problem Formulation
In this section we provide a motivating example to illustrates the challenges of crowdworking systems and
then formulate the problem. We finally, explain the security model.
3.1 Motivating Example
Multi-platform crowdworking systems face two main privacy preserving challenges: enforcing multi-platform
regulations and supporting cross-platform tasks. We consider constraining the number of work hours in a
ridesharing use-case to illustrate the challenge of enforcing privacy preserving multi-platform regulations. In
ridesharing scenarios, a set of workers (i.e., drivers) gives rides to a set of requesters (i.e., travelers) through a
set of platforms, e.g., Uber, Lyft, Curb, and Juno, where each driver (resp. traveler) registers to one or more
platforms. Regulations on the hours of work often specify minimal and maximal number of work hours that
can be performed by the participants. For instance, (1) the total work hours of a driver per week may not
exceed 40 hours to follow the Fair Labor Standards Act5 (FLSA), (2) a driver has to work at least 5 hours per
week to be eligible for insurance coverage, and (3) the total work hours of all drivers on a platform should be
at least 1000 hours per week to enable the platform to fill for a tax refund. A multi-platform crowdworking
system needs to express and enforce such regulations while preserving the privacy of participants. Indeed,
the system needs to (1) provide a technical tool to enable official institutions expressing the regulations, (2)
support transparent sharing of information about the crowdworking tasks performed by each platform to
enable them checking the enforcement of regulations, and (3) preserve the privacy of participants.
Supporting complex cross-platform tasks that may need multiple contributions from possibly different plat-
forms raises the second set of challenges. For instance, a requester who has registered with Amazon Mech-
anical Turk, Appen and other microtask platforms might need hundreds or thousands of contributions at the
same time. The requester would like to accept these contributions from workers regardless of the platforms
the microtasks are performed on. Since workers from different platforms might want to perform these con-
tributions, the system needs to establish consensus among the various microtask platforms to assign workers
and provide the specified number of solutions without revealing any private information about the workers
to competing platforms.
3.2 Crowdworking Environment
3.2.1 Participants
Today’s realistic crowdworking environments consist of a set of workersW interacting with a set of requesters
R through a set of competing platforms P. We call participants the workers, platforms, and requesters of a
crowdworking environment. Each worker w ∈ W (1) registers to one or more platforms Pw ⊂ P according
to her preferences and, through the latter, (2) accesses the set of tasks available on Pw, (3) submits each
contribution to the platform p ∈ Pw she elects, and (4) obtains a reward for her work. On the other side,
each requester r ∈ R similarly (1) registers to one or more platforms Pr ⊂ P, (2) issues a submission which
contains her tasks Tr to one or more platforms p ∈ Pr, (3) receives the contributions of each worker w
5https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa
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Figure 1: A crowdworking infrastructure
registered to Pr ∩ Pw having elected a task t ∈ Tr, and (4) launches the distribution of rewards. Platforms
are thus in charge of facilitating the intermediation between workers and requesters. A crowdworking process
pi connects three parties – a worker w, a platform p, and a requester r – with each other and aims to
solve a task t ∈ Tr through p, and consists in the steps (2) to (4) above. Figure 1 shows a crowdworking
infrastructure with four platforms, four workers and four requesters.
In this work, we do not focus on the description of tasks and contributions and consequently model both as
arbitrary bitstrings {0, 1}∗ and make no assumption on the distribution of rewards to workers6.
Finally, workers, requesters, and platforms are all equipped with the cryptographic material required by
SEPAR: a pair of usual public/private asymetric keys (e.g., RSA) and a pair of public/private asymetric
group keys (e.g., [11]) where the union of all workers forms a group (in the sense of group signatures), similar
to the union of all requesters, and to the union of all platforms. Participants acquire them when joining
SEPAR (see Section 5 for more information).
3.2.2 Interactions with Institutions
Crowdworking environments do not exist in a vacuum but rather are integrated within society as a whole.
The participants need in particular to interact with legal institutions (in order to enforce the local labor laws)
and with social institutions (in order to enable local social rights). We capture these interactions through
less-than constraints and greater-than certificates.
Constraints. A set of constraints embodies the labor policy that applies to a given crowdworking environ-
ment. Essentially, a constraint expresses a limit on the actions that can be performed by the participants
of the crowdworking environment, e.g., the total working hours of a worker per week must not exceed 40
hours across all platforms. Constraints must be expressed in an intuitive language that is both expressive
enough to adapt to a variety of real-world policies and at the same time restrictive enough to guarantee the
efficiency of their enforcement.
Certificates. A certificate is a piece of information that participants can provide to third parties to prove
that they took part in a given crowdworking process. Contrary to constraints, they are not a priori spe-
cification: they are made available during the process to the participants involved and can be provided by
participants to other parties on demand after the process. Certificates are well suited to real-world situ-
ations such as conforming to legal obligations, suing other parties in court in case of abuse, or legitimizing
applications to grants or tax refund depending on local legislation, e.g., a driver has to work at least 5 hours
6A task embeds all the information necessary to be performed by a worker (e.g., the precise description of the
work that must be performed, a reward policy for distributing the reward among contributors, the expected number
of contributions).
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per week to be eligible for insurance coverage or the total work hours of all drivers on a platform should be
at least 1000 hours per week to enable the platform to fill for a tax refund.
3.2.3 Distribution of Platforms
We do not make any assumptions on the inner working of platforms, especially on their inner implementation
of crowdworking processes (e.g., task assignment algorithm, workers contributions delivery). However, we
stress that our approach is compatible with distributed infrastructures, supported by one or more data
centers, following today’s fault tolerance and performance standards. In particular, we assume each platform
consists of a set of nodes in an asynchronous distributed network. Nodes are connected by point-to-point
bi-directional communication channels. To guarantee data consistency, a total order among the transactions
of each platform is needed. To establish a total order, asynchronous consensus protocols can be used where
nodes agree on an ordering of incoming requests using the state machine replication algorithm [23]. Each
node has a distributed persistent transparent datastore where transactions are committed to the datastore.
In this paper and due to the unique features of blockchains such as transparency, provenance, and fault
tolerance, the datastore is implemented using a blockchain.
A crowdworking environment processes internal, i.e., submitted to a single platform, and cross-platform, i.e.,
submitted to more than one platform, tasks. Processing a task (either internal or cross-platform) requires
agreement from the nodes of the involved platforms. To establish agreement among the nodes, we introduce
local and cross-platform consensus protocols. In addition, we enable all platforms checking the satisfaction
of constraints by establishing consensus among every node of all platforms. To do so, a global consensus
protocol is introduced.
3.3 Security Model
We consider that any participant in a crowdworking environment may act as a covert adversary [6] that aims
at inferring anything that can be inferred from the execution sequence and that is able to deviate from the
protocol if no other participant detects it. Adversarial participants may additionally collude.
The privacy definition that we adopt requires that no participant obtains or infers any information about
a crowdworking process beyond what is strictly needed for accomplishing its local crowdworking processes
and for the distributed enforcement of constraints. We formalize below this requirement by defining the set
of secrets and by using the well-known simulatability model often used by secure multi-party computation
algorithms.
Consider a crowdworking process pi between worker w, platform p, and requester r for solving task t. The
information generated by the execution of pi consists at least of a starting event BEGIN, an ending event
END, and the relationship between the three participants (w, p, and r) with the task t. We denote it by the
6-tuple (BEGIN, END, w, p, r, t). The {BEGIN, END} events are abstract representations of the information that
pi is starting or ending. They may be given, e.g., by the exchange of messages between the participants to pi,
and may come with additional concrete information (e.g., timestamps, IP address). Our privacy definition
focuses on workers, requesters, and tasks and requires the secrecy of the corresponding parts of this tuple
from the participants that are not involved in pi. However, since a given task t may be submitted to several
platforms and then be accessed by several workers, the platforms and workers not involved in pi but that
receive t still need to learn that t has been completed (e.g., to manage their local copy of the task). We
capture this subtlety through a varying set of disclosures, denoted δpi, plugged into a unified simulation-based
privacy definition. Our definition does not leak any information about the worker and the requester involved
in pi when it is not needed by pi. It tolerates the disclosure of the {BEGIN, END} events and of the platform p
to all participants, whatever their involvement in pi. This allows platforms to share information for enforcing
global regulations (e.g., check that all participants satisfy the related constraints before executing pi), and to
collaborate for managing correctly the cross-platforms tasks. Note that for simplicity we will use the same
notation δ for disclosures concerning sets of crowdworking processes as well.
We specify the set of disclosures as follows:
• Secrecy against the participants that are not involved in pi and that have not received task t from
requester r: they must not learn anything about the worker, the task, and the requester involved in
pi:
δpi¬R¬I = (BEGIN, END, p)
• Secrecy against the platforms and workers that have received the task t from r but that are not
involved in pi: they must be aware that t has been performed (e.g., for not contributing to t) but
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must not know that it has been performed by worker w:
δpiR¬I = (BEGIN, END, p, r, t)
• Secrecy against participants that are directly involved in pi (and have thus received task t): the
information about the execution of pi disclosed to w, p, and r is complete simply because they run
pi7:
δpiRI = (BEGIN, END, w, p, r, t)
Definition 3.1 Let Π be a set of crowdworking processes executed by σ an instance of SEPAR over a set of
participants. We say that σ is δΠ-private if, for all pi ∈ Π, for all computationally-bounded adversaries A, the
sets of disclosures (δpi¬R¬I , δpiR¬I , δpiRI), arbitrary background knowledge χ ∈ {0, 1}∗, the distribution represent-
ing the adversarial knowledge over the input dataset in the real setting is computationally indistinguishable
from the distribution representing the adversarial knowledge in an ideal setting in which a trusted third party
cp executes the crowdworking process Π of σ:
REALσ,A(χ,δpi
i
)(W,P,R, T ) c≡ IDEALcp,A(χ,δpi
i
)(W,P,R, T )
where i ∈ {¬R¬I,R¬I,RI}, and REAL denotes the adversarial knowledge in the real setting and IDEAL its
counterpart in the ideal setting.
3.4 Problem
We address the problem of designing the SEPAR system in charge of allowing the execution of crowdworking
processes (1) while guaranteeing together the correctness of the constraints defined by external institutions
and the privacy of participants against covert adversaries, over (2) distributed crowdworking platforms that
communicate through the local, cross-platforms, and global consensuses.
4 Expressing Global Regulations
We express global regulations using constraints and certificates. A constraint demonstrates a limit on the
actions that can be performed by the participants of the crowdworking environment and a certificate is a
piece of information that participants can provide to third parties to prove that they took part in a given
crowdworking process. In this Section, we express both constraints and certificates.
4.1 Expressing Constraints
Syntax. We define a constraint c as being essentially (1) a triple (w, p, r) that associates a worker w,
a platform p, and a requester r, and (2) a threshold θ (an integer) that defines the upper bound of c8.
Intuitively, a constraint ((w, p, r), θ) states that there must not be more than θ actions between the worker
w, the platform p, and the requester r (see below for the detailed semantics). We also allow two wildcards to
be written in any position of a triple: ∗ and ∀. First, the ∗ wildcard allows to ignore one or more elements of
a triple9. For example (∗, p, r) means that the constraint applies to the couple (p, r). A triple may contain
up to three ∗ wildcards. An element of a triple that is not a ∗ wildcard is called a specified participant of the
constraint. Second, the ∀ wildcard factorizes the writing of triples because it allows to express a constraint
that must hold for all participants in the same group of participants10. For example, (∀, p, r) represents the
following set of triples: {(w, p, r)}, ∀w ∈ W. We denote C the complete set of constraints.
Semantics. We give now a precise definition of the semantics of our constraints by illustrating how they
translate to SQL constraints. Let assume that there exists a table of actions A that records all actions
performed between any triple of worker, platform, requester. The attributes of A are WORKER, PLATFORM,
REQUESTER. For simplicity, we consider a constraint c without any wildcard, i.e., c ← ((w, p, r), θ). The
semantics of c is the same as the following SQL query :
7There exist cases where the platform acts as a proxy between a worker and a requester such that one side has no
information on the other side. Our privacy definition does not require that, but is compatible with more stringent
secrecy.
8Extending constraints with, e.g., labels for defining categories of actions (e.g., working time) or validity periods
(e.g., "one week", "one month"), is straightforward.
9Intuitively, the ∗ wildcard means "whatever".
10Intuitively, the ∀ wildcard means "for each".
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ALTER TABLE A ADD CONSTRAINT c CHECK (
NOT EXISTS (
SELECT ∗ FROM A
WHERE WORKER = w AND PLATFORM = p AND REQUESTER = r
GROUP BY WORKER, PLATFORM, REQUESTER
HAVING COUNT(∗) ≥ θ
) );
The presence of a ∗ wildcard in the triple simply leads to removing the corresponding attributes in the
WHERE and GROUP BY clauses. The presence of a ∀ wildcard leads to expanding it to the set containing all
the elements that it represents (e.g., all workers if the ∀ wildcard is at the first position in the triple) and to
generate the cartesian product between the resulting set and the elements at the two other positions of the
triple (that may be ∀ wildcards as well). Finally, the semantics of a set of constraints is the conjunction of
the constraints contained in the set.
Example. the weekly FLSA limit on the total work hours per worker can easily be expressed as cFLSA ←
((∀, ∗, ∗), 40).
4.2 Expressing Requests for Certificates
Syntax and Semantics. Certificates allow a participant called prover (e.g., worker) to prove to an external
entity called verifier (e.g., social security agency) that a minimal number of hours have been spent on
crowdworking platforms (e.g., for applying to insurance coverage). Requests for certificates (e.g., from social
security agencies) are expressed using the same syntax as the constraints with the following two differences.
First, the θ threshold does not represent an upper bound on actions that cannot be exceeded, but a lower
bound on actions that have to be proved.
And second, there must always be at least one specified participant in a request for certificates, i.e., typically
the prover. This syntax allows verifiers to follow minimal disclosure principles by requesting from the prover
exactly the information needed about the crowdworking processes performed. There is no need to request
the identities of the participants with whom the prover collaborated. Additionally, it is trivial to connect
multiple requests for certificates through conjunctions and disjunctions if needed. Examples. A social
security institution can request each worker w applying for insurance coverage to prove that she worked
in total more than 5 hours: r1 ← ((w, ∗, ∗), 5) is both necessary and sufficient. Similarly, the request
r2 ← ((∗, p, ∗), 1000) allows a tax institution to ask for each platform p applying for a tax refund to prove
that the total work hours of all its workers is at least 1000 hours.
5 Enforcing Global Regulations
In this section, we develop our conception of constraints and certificates, how they are built and how to use
them, and we prove the correctness and the privacy guarantees of our construction.
5.1 Implementing a Token-Based System
In this section we show how constraints and certificates, which are expressed in Section 4, can be enforced
and produced respectively. Inspired by e-cash systems, we enforce constraints and produce certificates by
managing two budgets per participant while preserving both the privacy of participants and the correctness of
budgets. Our proposal makes use of a centralized authority, called the registration authority (RA for short).
RA registers the participants to the crowdworking environment, sends them the required cryptographic
material, receives the set of constraints, and manages the budgets. The required cryptographic material
includes a pair of public/private asymetric keys (e.g., RSA) and a pair of public/private asymmetric group
keys (e.g., [11]) for which the registration authority is the group manager, while the set of constraints
may be expressed by the regulators through a dedicated interface. We instantiate the budgets based on
labeled, single-use, anonymous tokens and use a persistent transparent datastore to guarantee their correct
and validated spending by participants. The persistent datastore is implemented using a blockchains. To
process crowdworking tasks, our token-based system is defined by five functions: GENERATE for initializing
the budgets and refilling them, SPEND for spending portions of the budgets, PROVE for providing certificates
to a third party, CHECK for checking whether a given spending is allowed or not, and ALERT for reporting
dubious spending.
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5.1.1 The GENERATE Function
The registration authority uses the GENERATE function to initialize the budgets, i.e., constraint and certificate
tokens of all participants (i.e., workers, platforms, requesters) and refill them periodically11 according to the
set of constraints C to enforce.
Constraint tokens. For each constraint c ← ((w, p, r), θ), the registration authority generates θ tokens
and sends a copy of each token to each specified participant of c. A token consists of a public and a private
component. The public component is a pair made of a number used only once (referred to as a nonce below)
generated by the registration authority and a signature of the nonce produced by the registration authority12.
The public component will be used later (upon completion of the corresponding task) by other platforms
to check the validity of tokens. The private component is an index allowing the participants involved in
a crowdworking process to select the correct set of tokens given the other specified participants involved
in the process. We implement this private component as a list containing the public keys of the specified
participants (in the corresponding constraint)13. Let tk† be a constraint token, tk†pub be its public component,
tk†priv be its private component, N be a nonce, and pubs the list of public keys. The constraint token is thus
the couple (tk†pub, tk
†
priv) where tk
†
pub = (N,Sign(keypriv,RA, (N))) and tk
†
priv = pubs.
Certificate Tokens. Certificate tokens are generated initially by the registration authority for all parti-
cipants. For each crowdworking process, a single certificate token is linked to a fully specified triplet of
participants (w, p, r). The number of certificate tokens produced is decided initially, but their quantity is
not as easy to decide as for constraint tokens since it is not capped by a θ threshold. For simplicity, we
assume that there is at least one constraint in the system, and the smallest threshold for all constraints
is θmin. Then, θmin is a sufficient upper bound of the number of crowdworking processes in which any
given triplet of participants is involved. It is therefore enough to produce θmin × |W| × |P| × |R| certificate
tokens. In practice, the number of tokens produced can be drastically reduced in a straightforward manner
by letting participants declare to RA the subset of participants they may work with (e.g., selecting a subset
of platforms, or domains of interest).
As stated above, a certificate token always relates to a fully specified triplet (w, p, r) and to its owner o (i.e.,
one of the participants in the triplet). Similar to a constraint token, it consists of a public and a private
component. The public component consists of a nonce as well as the signature of the nonce produced by
the registration authority. The private component, on the other hand, is a triplet in which each element
certifies (i.e., signs) the association between the owner o and another specified participant. More formally,
let tk∗ be a certificate token, tk∗pub be its public part, tk∗priv be its private part, N be a nonce, o be the
identity of the participant owner of the token, and (w, p, r) be the related triplet. The certificate token is thus
the pair (tk∗pub, tk∗priv) where tk∗pub = (N,Sign(keypriv,RA, (N))) and tk∗priv = (Sign(keypriv,RA, (N, o, w)),
Sign(keypriv,RA, (N, o, p)), Sign(keypriv,RA, (N, o, r))).
5.1.2 The SPEND Function
Requesters create and send their tasks to a platform and the platform submits the tasks in either its own
datastore (for local tasks) or all involved platforms (for cross-platform tasks). Once the task is published,
the workers can indicate their intent to perform the task by sending a contribution intent to their platforms.
If a contribution is still needed for the task, the SPEND function is performed as follow. First, for a given
constraint c ∈ C, the platform requests the public component of a constraint token corresponding to c from
the initiator (one of the specified participants in constraint c). For certificates, the platform is the initiator.
The platform includes the task, an identifier for the contribution (e.g., a nonce generated by the platform),
and a signature of the identifier concatenated to the task in its request message. Therefore, workers and
requesters will be able to prove that they were asked for tokens, even if the platform fails. The initiator
then chooses a token to spend and sends it to the platform. Once the platform receives the required token,
it sends the public component of the constraint token to all the specified participants. For certificates, the
11The refreshment rates of budgets is easily computed from the validity periods of constraints (see Section 4).
12Extending tokens with labels and/or timestamps for supporting the validity periods of constraints is straightfor-
ward.
13The use of a public key generated by the registration authority is important here because (1) it can be shared
among participants without disclosing their identities, i.e., it is a pseudonym, (2) the corresponding private key can
be used by participants for mutual authentication in order to guarantee the correctness of the index and consequently
of the choice of tokens.
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platform sends the public part of the certificate tokens to all participants of the process. The platform also
requires them to send back two signatures: (1) the group signature of the token (which will be later verified
by all platforms, together with the token, when it is shared with all platforms), and (2) the group signature
of the pair consisting of a token and a task. Note that the second signature while it does not reveal the task
by itself, can be used by participants to verify that tokens are used on the task they are intended to be used
on. Again, this demand is associated with the task and the identifier of the contribution, and is signed by
the platform.
Finally, for each task, a transaction consisting of all spent constraint tokens from each specified parti-
cipant (all spent certificate tokens from every participant in the case of certificates) is committed to the
datastore of all platforms. For each token, the transaction includes first, the public component of each
token, second, the group signature of the public component of each token (i.e., for a constraint token tk†:
GroupSign(keypriv,part, Group, tk†pub)), and third, the group signature of the public part of each token to-
gether with the associated task t (i.e., for a constraint token tk†: GroupSign(keypriv,part, Group, (t, tk†pub))).
5.1.3 The PROVE function
The PROVE function is used by participants to provide certificates to a third party. The use of certificate tokens
is relatively straightforward. During the crowdworking processes, participants store the private components
of certificate tokens which will be used later to deliver certificates on demand. A participant indeed initiates
the PROVE function by sending the related subpart(s) of the private component of the corresponding tokens
to the verifier. As an example, for a ((w, ∗, ∗), 5) request for certificates, the worker w sends the subparts
containing w from the private parts of all 5 certificate tokens. The verifier, first, checks the signature of the
registration authority to verify that the participant was involved in the task, and then, checks the nonce
stored in the datastore to ensure that the token has been shared and validated by all platforms.
5.1.4 The CHECK and ALERT Functions
The CHECK and ALERT functions are used to detect and report either the malicious behavior of participants
resulting in an invalid consumption of tokens or the failure of a platform. The complete set of verifications
protects against (1) the forgery of tokens (verification of the signatures), (2) the replay of tokens (verification
of the absence of double-spending), (3) the relay of tokens (verification of the absence of usurpation), and (4)
the illegitimate invalidation of tokens (timeout against malicious platform failures). The first two verifications
are straightforward and performed during the global consensus (when all platforms can access tokens and
signatures). We explain the last two verifications.
Usurpation. When a token is appended to the datastore of all platforms, anyone (whether involved in
the corresponding crowdworking process or not) can CHECK its nonce. If a participant detects a nonce
that was received from the registration authority but not spent14, she ALERTs the registration authority.
The registration authority will de-anonymize the group-signature of the corresponding participant (e.g., the
worker’s group signature if the alert comes from a worker), and checks whether it has been signed by the
same participant that sent the token. Similarly, if a participant detects that a token has not been spent on
the right task, she ALERTs the registration authority. After an alert, the registration authority has to act
either against the target participant of the alert (true positive) or against the participant originating the
alert (false positive). The possible actions (e.g., ban the participant) depend on the context.
Platform failure. If a platform fails after it requested tokens or signatures and does not recover (e.g.,
tokens are not appended to the datastore), the tokens revealed to the platform are lost: they cannot be
used in any other crowdworking process because they are not anonymous anymore (i.e., the platform knows
the association between them and the corresponding participants), and they are not spent either. In that
case, workers or requesters send an ALERT to the registration authority including (1) the identifier of the
platform, (2) the identifier of the task, and (3) all the requests received from the platform. The registration
authority then checks whether the number of requests sent by the platform for the given task matches the
corresponding number of messages committed in the datastore. If there are more requests, the registration
authority sets a timeout (e.g., to let unfinished transactions end or the platform recover from a failure).
When the timeout is over, the registration authority can act against the platform.
14For example, a platform p can collude with a worker w1 to spend a token dedicated to a (w2, p, ∗) constraints.
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Figure 2: Sequence chart (references to specified participants include all participants for certificate tokens)
5.2 Task Processing Sequence
In summary, five main phases exist during the processing of a crowdworking task are: (1) initialization, (2)
publication, (3) assertion, (4) verification, and (5) execution.
Initialization. The registration authority provides all parties with their keys and tokens.
Publication. Requesters create and send their tasks to platforms. If a requester wants to publish its task
on more that one platform (i.e., a cross-platform task), the involved platforms collaborate with each other
to create a common instance of the task. The involved platforms then publish the tasks on their datastores
through submission transactions and inform their workers in their preferred manner for accessing tasks.
Assertion. After a worker has retrieved a task, the worker sends a contribution intent message to the
platform without revealing the actual contribution. The platform then updates the number of required
contributions for the task and publishes the contribution intent in its datastore through a claim transaction.
For cross-platform tasks, the platform informs other involved platforms about the received contribution
intent, so that all involved platforms agree with the number (and order) of the received contribution intents
(i.e., claim transactions). If the desired number of contribution for the task has been achieved, the process
is aborted. Note that while the requester does not choose the workers, it is possible to enforce a selection
with a priori criteria, passed through the platform. Another straight-forward enhancement would be to
add a communication step, by forwarding the contribution intent, together with the worker’s identity to the
requester, and letting her approve of it or not. This communication, however, requires the disclosure of the
worker’s identity to requesters even before a contribution is accepted.
Verification. Once the contribution intent has been accepted by the platform(s), the platform asks the
corresponding requester and worker to send the required tokens and signatures, through the SPEND function,
developed in Section 5.1.2. Upon receiving all tokens and signatures, the platform shares them with all
platforms and the tokens and their signatures are published to the datastores through verification transactions.
From this point, anyone can check the validity of requirements with the CHECK function (and ALERT if
required), as developed in Section 5.1.4.
Execution. Once all parties have checked the validity of the task, its tokens and group signatures, the
actual contribution can be given to the requester and reward to the worker through the platform.
A sequence chart of this protocol is provided in Figure 2.
5.3 Privacy Analysis
We show below in the suite of Theorem 1, Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Theorem 2 that the global execution of
SEPAR satisfies the δΠ-private model against covert adversaries.
First, Theorem 1 restricts the adversarial behavior to inferences (i.e., similar to a honest-but-curious ad-
versary) and shows that the execution of SEPAR satisfies δΠ-privacy. Second, we extend the possible
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behaviors to malicious behaviors aiming at jeopardizing the enforcement of constraints and of requests for
certificates, and show that they are systematically detected by SEPAR (Lemma 1 focuses on constraints and
Lemma 2 on certificates). This prevents covert adversaries to perform malicious actions, limiting them to
inferences. Since Theorem 1 shows that SEPAR is δΠ-private against adversaries restricted to inferences, and
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 show that malicious behaviors are prevented, it follows that SEPAR is δΠ-private
against covert adversaries (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1 (Privacy (inferences)) For all sets of crowdworking processes Π executed over participants W,
P, and R by an instance of SEPAR σ, then it holds that σ is δΠ-private against covert adversaries restricted
to inferences.
Proof:[(sketch)] First, we focus on the content of tokens and show that it is harmless. For each crowdwork-
ing process pi, the information contained within the tokens exchanged and stored in the datastore (shared
by all platforms) is made of (1) the public parts tkpub of the tokens involved (i.e., a nonce and a signature)
and (2) of the group signatures of the participants to pi. The nonce is generated by the registration au-
thority independently from pi, thus do not leak any information about pi15. Since the group signatures are
generated by a semantically-secure group signature scheme, they do not leak anything to the real adversary
(computationally bounded) beyond the groups of the signers, which is also available to the ideal adversary.
Second, we concentrate on the information disclosed along the execution sequence of crowdworking processes.
We consider below each disclosure set δpii in turn and show that the computational indistinguishability
requirement between the ideal setting and the real setting (where the instance of SEPAR σ executes Π) is
satisfied in all cases.
Disclosure set δpi¬R¬I . The δpi¬R¬I disclosure set contains the information allowed to be disclosed to the
participants that are not involved in a crowdworking process pi ∈ Π and that have not received the related
task (i.e., (BEGIN, END, p)). First, we focus on the subset of such participants that are requesters or workers.
In the ideal settings, these participants learn nothing beyond the information contained in δpi¬R¬I . In the
real setting, when pi is executed by σ, these participants are not involved in any consensus. They are only
able to observe the state of the datastore. The latter is updated exactly once for pi, when pi ends, for storing
the tokens spent: only the ending event (END) is disclosed, which is already contained within δpi¬R¬I . Second,
we focus on the platforms. In the ideal setting, they are given δpi¬R¬I . In the real setting, they participate to
the global consensus and are able to observe the state of the datastore. Consequently, they learn p from the
global consensus (i.e., the platform that initiates the global consensus) and the ending event END16. Both
are already contained within δpi¬R¬I .
Disclosure set δpiR¬I . The δpiR¬I disclosure set contains the information allowed to be disclosed to the workers
and platforms that have received the task t from r but that are not involved in the crowdworking process
pi ∈ Π (i.e., (BEGIN, END, p, r, t)). First, we focus on the subset of such participants that are workers. In the
ideal settings, they learn nothing beyond the information contained in δpiR¬I . In the real setting, we see from
the global execution sequence of SEPAR that (1) they are not involved in any consensus, (2) but are able
to observe the state of the datastore, (3) have received the task t, and (4) may receive an abort from their
platform if they contribute to t while t has already been solved. From (2) and (4), they are able to learn the
ending events of crowdworking processes, from (3) they learn t, and from (1) they do not learn any other
information. As a result, they learn (END, t), which is contained in δpiR¬I . Second, we focus on the subset of
participants that are platforms. In the ideal settings, they learn nothing beyond the information contained
in δpiR¬I . In the real setting, (1) they receive the tasks from the requesters, (2) they participate to the
cross-platform consensuses and to the global consensuses in addition to (3) observing the same information
as the workers. From (1) they learn t and r for each process pi ∈ Π. From (2), they learn p, BEGIN, and
END because: the cross-platform consensus discloses the initiating platform and the starting event, and the
global consensus discloses the initiating platform together with the ending event. From (3), they learn the
ending event and the task. As a result, such platforms learn about all pi ∈ Π the following information
(BEGIN, END, r, p, t), which is exactly δpiR¬I .
15Including a generation timestamp into the public part of tokens, for supporting the validity periods of constraints,
would not leak information about pi beyond its probable execution timeframe, which is already captured by the
BEGIN and END events allowed to leak in the δΠ-confidentiality model. Indeed, the timestamps would be generated
by the registration authority independently from pi.
16The verifications performed by the worker and the requester involved in pi are performed on the instance of the
datastore stored on p. Indeed, the block resulting from the global consensus contains all the necessary information
both for performing the verification and for checking that it results from the global consensus.
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Disclosure set δpiRI . The computational indistinguishability requirement between the real setting and the
ideal setting is trivially satisfied for the δpiRI set of disclosures because δpiRI contains all the information about
the execution of the crowdworking process pi so σ does not (and cannot) disclose more information.
Lemma 1 (Detection of malicious behaviors (constraints)) A crowdworking process pi executed over parti-
cipants W, P, and R by an instance of SEPAR σ, completes successfully without rising a legitimate alert if
and only if it does not jeopardize any constraint.
Proof:[(sketch)] We have to show first that the constraint tokens allocated to participants can be spent, and
second that participants cannot spend more.
Participants can spend their tokens. In order to prevent participants from spending their constraint
tokens, an attacker has three main possibilities. First, she can try to acquire tokens belonging to another
participant and to spend them (i.e., relay attack). However, this rises an ALERT with certainty. Indeed, if
a token is spent by an illegitimate participant, it is stored on the datastore and is thus accessible to the
legitimate participant who is able to detect it through the nonce and to rise an ALERT to the registration
authority (including the group signatures stored along the token). Second, the attacker (platform only)
could try to misuse tokens by spending them in a way that was not intended by the legitimate owner (i.e.,
relay attack). However, this would be detected by participants as well because the signature of the task
would not be valid. Third, the attacker (platform only) may abort the process after having received tokens
but before performing the global consensus (i.e., illegitimate invalidation). However, after a timeout, the
other involved participants simply send an ALERT to the registration authority and prove that their tokens
were requested by the platform (signatures of the requests for tokens and signatures), and therefore that the
platform behaves illegitimately.
Participants cannot spend more. First, an attacker may produce additional tokens (i.e., forge attack).
However, the public parts of tokens must contain valid signatures produced by the registration authority.
Second, an attacker may try to spend a token more than once (i.e., replay attack). However, the nonce of
a token that must be spent must not already be in the datastore. Finally, an attacker may simply omit
sending any token. However, the public parts of tokens are required for the successful completion of the
global consensus.
Lemma 2 (Detection of malicious behaviors (certificates)) A participant can produce a certificate about a
crowdworking process pi executed over participants W, P, and R by an instance of SEPAR σ, if and only if
(1) she was involved in pi and (2) pi completes successfully.
Proof:[(sketch)] The correctness of our token-based system for answering to requests for certificates is trivial
to demonstrate. First, certificates about a crowdworking process pi that completed successfully can always
be produced by the participants involved in pi. Indeed, the certificate tokens are produced by the registration
authority and sent to all participants (i.e., the number of certificate tokens is correct), and only the successful
crowdworking processes store the certificate tokens in the datastore. Second, participants cannot spend a
certificate token more than once because the nonce of a token that must be spent must not already be in
the datastore. Third, participants cannot produce any certificate token by themselves because their public
parts must contain valid signatures produced by the registration authority.
Theorem 2 (Privacy (inferences and malicious behaviors)) For all sets of crowdworking processes Π ex-
ecuted over participants W, P, and R by an instance of SEPAR σ, then it holds that σ is δΠ-private against
covert adversaries.
Proof: Theorem 1 shows that the execution of SEPAR satisfies δΠ-privacy against covert adversaries re-
stricted to inferences, while Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 shows that malicious behaviors aiming at jeopardizing
the guarantees token-based system are detected and consequently prevented within SEPAR. As a result it
follows directly that the execution of SEPAR satisfies δΠ-privacy against covert adversaries.
6 Coping with Distribution
SEPAR is a multi-platform crowdworking system where multiple globally distributed platforms collaborate
with each other to process crowdworking tasks. To realize such distributed collaborations and due to the
unique features of permissioned blockchains such as transparency and provenance, which are needed by
crowdworking applications, SEPAR is deployed on a permissioned blockchain to implement the persistent
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Figure 3: (a): The ledger of a system consisting of four platforms, (b), (c), (d), and (e): The views of the
blockchain from the four different platforms
datastore. In this section, we first present the distributed blockchain ledger of SEPAR and then, show how
SEPAR establishes consensus on the order of transactions within and across different platforms.
6.1 Blockchain Ledger
In a blockchain, transactions are recorded in an append-only data structure, called Blockchain ledger. The
blockchain ledger in SEPAR includes all submission, claim, and verification transactions of all internal as well
as cross-platform tasks. To ensure data consistency, an ordering among transactions in which a platform
is involved is needed. The total order of transactions in the blockchain ledger is captured by chaining the
transactions (blocks) together, i.e. each transaction block includes a sequence number or the cryptographic
hash of the previous transaction block. Since SEPAR supports both internal and cross-platform tasks and
more than one platform are involved in each cross-platform transaction, similar to [2,3], the ledger is formed
as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the nodes of the graph are transaction blocks (each block includes
a single transaction) and edges enforce the order among transaction blocks. In addition to submission, claim,
and verification transactions, a unique initialization transaction (block), called the genesis transaction is also
included in the ledger.
Fig. 3(a) shows a blockchain ledger created in the SEPAR model for a blockchain infrastructure consisting
of four platforms p1, p2, p3, and p4. In this figure, λ is the genesis block of the blockchain, ti’s are submission
transactions, ticj is the j-th claim transaction of task ti, and tiv is the verification transaction of task ti. In
Fig. 3(a), t10, t20, t30, and t40 are internal submission transactions of different platforms. In SEPAR, as can be
seen, the internal transactions of different platforms can be appended to the ledger in parallel. t10c1, t10c2,
..., and t40c2 are the corresponding claim transactions. As shown, t10 requires 3 contributions (thus 3 claim
transactions) whereas each of t20, t30, and t40 needs two contributions. t10v, t20v, t30v, and t40v are also
the verification transactions. t11,21 is a cross-platform submission among platforms p1 and p2. Similarly, t31,41
is a cross-platform submission among platforms p3 and p4. Here, t11,21 needs a single contribution and t31,41
requires two contributions. Note that the claim transactions of a cross-platform task might be initiated by
different platforms and as mentioned earlier, the order of these claim transactions is important (to recognize
the n first claims). Finally, t22,32,42 is a cross-platform task among platforms p2, p3, and p4 that is processed
in parallel to the internal task t12 of platform p1.
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Figure 4: SEPAR infrastructure
The introduced blockchain ledger includes all transactions of internal as well as cross-platform tasks initiated
by all platforms. However, due to the data privacy requirement, each platform must access only a subset
of these transactions, i.e., the transactions in which the platform is involved. One way to achieve data
privacy is to encrypt all transactions using cryptographic techniques and keep an identical blockchain ledger
on every platform. However, the considerable overhead of such techniques results in low performance [4],
and in addition, each platform will store many transactions that are not relevant to the platform. As a
result and for the sake of performance, in SEPAR, the entire blockchain ledger is not maintained by any
platform and each platform only maintains its own view of the blockchain ledger including (1) all submission
and claim transactions of its internal tasks, (2) all submission and claim transactions of the cross-platform
tasks that the platform is involved in them, and (3) verification transactions of all tasks. Note that verification
transactions are replicated on every platform to enable all platforms to check the satisfaction of constraints.
The blockchain ledger is indeed the union of all these physical views.
Fig. 3(b)-(e) show the views of the blockchain ledger for platforms p1, p2, p3, and p4 respectively. As can
be seen, each platform pi maintains only submission and claim transactions of all internal tasks as well as
cross-platform tasks that pi is involved in them and verification transactions of all tasks. For example and
as shown in Fig. 3(b), platform p1 maintains all transactions of its two internal tasks t10 and t12. These
are either submission transactions, i.e., t10 and t12, or claim transactions, i.e., t10c1, t10c2, t10c3, t12c1, t12c2,
or verification transactions, i.e., t10v, t12v. Platform p1 also maintains cross-platform transactions that p1 is
involved in, i.e., t11,21, t11,21c1, and t11,21v. Finally, p1 maintains the verification transactions of all other tasks
within the system, i.e. t20v, t30v, t40v, t31,41v, and t22,32,42v. Note that, since there is no data dependency
between the verification transactions of the tasks that a platform is not involved in and the transactions of the
tasks that a platform is involved in, the verification transactions might be appended to the ledgers in different
orders, e.g., t20v (of platform p2) and t40v (of platform p4) are appended to the ledger of platforms p1 and
p3 in two different orders.
6.2 Consensus in SEPAR
In SEPAR, each platform consists of a (disjoint) set of nodes (i.e., replicas) where the platform replicates
its own view of the blockchain ledger on those nodes to achieve fault tolerance. Nodes follow either the
crash or Byzantine failure model. In the crash failure model, nodes operate at arbitrary speed, may fail
by stopping, and may restart, however, in the Byzantine failure model, faulty nodes may exhibit arbitrary,
potentially malicious, behavior. Nodes of the same or different platforms need to establish consensus on
a unique order in which entries are appended to the blockchain ledger. To establish consensus among
the nodes, asynchronous fault-tolerant protocols have been used. Fault-tolerant protocols use the State
Machine Replication (SMR) algorithm [23] to guarantee safety where nodes agree on an ordering of incoming
transactions. Crash fault-tolerant protocols guarantee safety in an asynchronous network using 2f+1 nodes
to overcome the simultaneous failure of any f nodes while in Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols, 3f+1 nodes
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Figure 5: Normal case operation in (a) Paxos [24] and (b) PBFT [13]
are usually needed to provide the safety property in the presence of f malicious nodes. Figure 4 shows
the crowdworking infrastructure of Figure 1 where each platform consists of 4 replicas (assuming Byzantine
failure model and f = 1) and replicas use a blockchain to store data.
Completion of a crowdworking task, as discussed earlier, requires a single submission, one or more claim, and
a verification transaction. For an internal task of a platform, submission and claim transactions are replicated
only on the nodes of the platform, hence, local consensus among nodes of the platform on the order of
the transaction is needed. For a cross-platform task, on the other hand, submission and claim transactions
are replicated on every node of all (and only) involved platforms. As a result, cross-platform consensus
among the nodes of all involved platforms is needed. Finally, verification transactions will be appended to the
blockchain of all platforms, therefore, all nodes of every platform participate in a global consensus protocol.
In this section, we show how local, cross-platform, and global consensus are established in the presence of
crash-only or Byzantine nodes.
6.2.1 Local Consensus
Processing a submission or a claim transaction of an internal task requires local consensus where nodes of a
single platform, independent of other platforms, establish agreement on the order of the transaction. The
local consensus protocol in SEPAR is pluggable and depending on the failure model of nodes, i.e., crash-only
or Byzantine, a platform uses a crash fault-tolerant protocol, e.g., Paxos [24], or a Byzantine fault-tolerant
protocol, e.g., PBFT [12]. Figure 5 shows the normal case operation of both Paxos and PBFT protocols.
The local consensus protocol is initiated by a pre-elected node of the platform, called the primary. When
the primary p receives a valid internal transaction (either submission or claim), it initiates a local consensus
algorithm by multicasting a message, e.g., acceptmessage in Paxos or pre-preparemessage in PBFT, including
the requested transaction to other nodes of the platform. To provide a total order among transactions, the
primary also assigns a sequence number to the request. Instead of a sequence number, the primary can also
include the cryptographic hash of the previous transaction block in the message. If the transaction is a claim
transaction, the primary includes the cryptographic hash of the corresponding submission transaction and
any previously received claim transactions for that particular task (if any). The nodes of the platform then
establish agreement on a total order of transactions using the utilized consensus protocol and append the
transaction to the blockchain ledger.
6.2.2 Cross-Platform Consensus
Submission and claim transactions of a cross-platform task must be appended to the blockchains of all involved
platforms in the same order to ensure data consistency. To process such transactions, therefore, consensus
among the nodes of all (and only) involved platforms is needed. SEPAR addresses the lack of trust in the
collaboration between platforms, by using an asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol to establish
consensus on the order of cross-platform transactions. Since the number of nodes of each platform depends
on the utilized consensus protocol within the platform (i.e. crash fault-tolerant protocols require 2f + 1
whereas Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols require 3f + 1 nodes), the required number of matching replies
from each platform, i.e., the quorum size, to ensure the safety of protocol depends on the failure model of
nodes of the platform. We define local-majority as the required number of matching replies from the nodes
of a platform. For a platform with crash-only nodes, local-majority is f + 1 (from the total 2f + 1 nodes),
whereas for a platform with Byzantine nodes, local-majority is 2f + 1 (from the total 3f + 1 nodes).
SEPAR processes cross-platform transactions in four phases: prepare, propose, accept, and commit. Upon
receiving a cross-platform (submission or claim) transaction, the (pre-elected) primary node of the (recipient)
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Algorithm 1 Cross-Platform Consensus
1: init():
2: r := node_id
3: pi := the platform that initiates the consensus
4: pi(p) := the primary node of cluster p
5: P := the set of involved platforms
6: pi(P ) := the primary nodes of clusters in P
7: upon receiving valid transaction m and (r == pi(pi))
8: multicast 〈〈PREPARE,hi,d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to pi(P )
9: multicast 〈〈PROPOSE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to all nodes of pi
10: upon receiving valid µ= 〈〈PREPARE,hi,d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 and r==pi(pj)
11: if r is not involved in any uncommitted request m′ where m and m′ intersect in some other platform pk
12: multicast 〈〈PROPOSE, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) , µ〉 to all nodes of pj
13: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) to P
14: upon receiving valid 〈〈PROPOSE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 and r ∈ pi
15: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, d, r〉σr to P
16: upon receiving valid 〈〈PROPOSE, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) , µ〉 and r ∈ pj
17: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σr to P
18: upon receiving valid matching 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σr from local-majority of every platform pj in P
19: multicast 〈COMMIT, hi, hj , ..., hk, d, r〉σr to P
20: upon receiving valid 〈COMMIT, hi, hj , ..., hk, d, r〉σr from local-majority of every platform in P
21: append the transaction block to the ledger
platform initiates the consensus protocol by multicasting a prepare message to the primary node of all involved
platforms. Each primary node then assigns a sequence number to the request and multicasts a proposemessage
to every node of its platform. During the accept and commit phases, all nodes of every involved platform
communicate to each other to reach agreement on the order of the cross-platform transaction.
Algorithm 1 presents the normal case of cross-platform consensus in SEPAR. Although not explicitly men-
tioned, every sent and received message is logged by nodes. As shown in lines 1-6 of the algorithm, pi is
the platform that initiates the transaction, pi(p) represents the primary node of platform p, P is the set
of involved platforms in the transaction where pi(P ) represents their current primary nodes (one node per
platform).
Once the primary pi(pi) of the initiator platform pi receives a valid submission or claim transaction, as presented
in lines 7-8, the primary node assigns sequence number hi to the request and multicasts a signed prepare
message 〈〈PREPARE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to the primary nodes of all involved platforms where m is the received
message (either submission or claim) and d = D(m) is the digest of m. The sequence number hi represents the
correct order of the transaction block in the initiator platform pi. If the transaction is a claim transaction,
the primary includes the cryptographic hash of the corresponding submission transaction as well. As shown
in line 9, the primary node also multicasts a signed propose message 〈〈PROPOSE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to the nodes
of its platform where d = D(m) is the digest of m.
As indicated in lines 10-12, once the primary node of some platform pj receives a prepare message µ from
the primary node of the initiator platform, it first validates the message. If node r is currently waiting for
a commit message of some cross-platform transaction m′ where the involved platforms of the two requests
m and m′ intersect, the node does not process the new transaction m before the earlier transaction m′ gets
committed. This ensures that requests are committed in the same order on different platforms. Otherwise, it
assigns sequence number hj to the message and multicasts a signed propose message 〈〈PROPOSE, hj , d〉σpi(pj) , µ〉
to the nodes of its platform. The primary node pi(pj) also piggybacks the prepare message µ to its propose
message to enable the node to access the request and validate the propose message. The primary node pi(pj),
as presented in line 13, multicasts a signed accept message 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d〉σpi(pj) to every node of all involved
platforms.
Upon receiving a propose message Once a node r of an involved platform pj receives a propose message, as
indicated in lines 8-10, it validates the signature and message digest (if the node belongs to the initiator
platform (i = j), it also checks hi to be valid (within a certain range)) since a malicious primary might
multicast a request with an invalid sequence number. In addition, if the node is currently involved in an
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Figure 6: Two concurrent cross-platform transaction flows for (a) crash-only and (b) Byzantine nodes in
SEPAR where two disjoint sets of platforms are involved in each task
uncommitted cross-platform request m′ where the involved platforms of two requests m and m′ overlap in
some other platform, the node does not process the new request m before the earlier request m′ is processed.
This is needed to ensure requests are committed in the same order on different platforms. The node then
multicasts a signed accept message including the corresponding sequence number hj (that represents the
order of m in platform pj), and the digest d = D(m) to every node of all involved platforms.
As presented in lines 18-19, each node waits for valid matching accept messages from a local majority (i.e.,
either f + 1 or 2f + 1 depending on the failure model) of every involved platform with hi and d that matches
the propose message which was sent by primary pi(pi). We define the predicate accepted-localpj (m,hi, hj , r)
to be true if and only if node r has received the request m, a propose for m with sequence number hi from
the initiator platform pi and accept messages from a local majority of an involved platform pj that match
the propose message. The predicate accepted(m,h, r) where h = [hi, hj , ..., hk] is then defined to be true on
node r if and only if accepted-localpj is true for every involved platform pj in cross-platform request m. The
order of sequence numbers in the predicate is an ascending order determined by their platform ids. The
propose and accept phases of the algorithm basically guarantee that non-faulty nodes agree on a total order
for the transactions. When accepted(m,h, v, r) becomes true, node r multicasts a signed commit message
〈COMMIT, h, d, r〉σr to all nodes of every involved platforms.
Finally, as shown in lines 20-21, node r waits for valid matching commit messages from a local majority of
every involved platform that matches its commit message. The predicate committed-localpj (m,h, r) is defined
to be true on node r if and only if accepted(m,h, r) is true and node r has accepted valid matching commit
messages from a local majority of platform pj that match the propose message for cross-platform transaction
m. The predicate committed(m,h, v, r) is then defined to be true on node r if and only if committed-localpj
is true for every involved platform pj in cross-platform transaction m. The committed predicate indeed
shows that at least f + 1 nodes of each involved platform have multicast valid commit messages. When
the committed predicate becomes true, the node considers the transaction as committed. If all transactions
with lower sequence numbers than hj have already been committed, the node appends a transaction block
including the transaction as well as the corresponding commit message to its copy of the ledger.
Figure 9 shows the normal case operation for SEPAR to execute two concurrent cross-platform transactions
in the presence of (a) crash-only and (b) Byzantine nodes where each transaction accesses two disjoint
platforms. The network consists of four platforms where each platform includes either three or four nodes
(f = 1).
In addition to the normal case operation, SEPAR has to deal with two other scenarios. First, when the
primary node fails. Second, when nodes have not received a quorum of matching accept messages from the
local-majority of every involved platform due to conflicting accept messages. Indeed, the primary nodes of
different platforms might multicast their propose messages in parallel, hence, different overlapping platforms
might receive the messages in different order. Furthermore, nodes might assign inconsistent sequence numbers
since they have not necessarily received the latest propose message from the primary of their own platform.
We use the techniques presented in SharPer [3] to address these two situations.
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Algorithm 2 Global Consensus
1: init():
2: r := node_id
3: pi := the platform that initiates the consensus
4: pi(p) := the primary node of cluster p
5: upon receiving valid transaction m and (r == pi(pi))
6: multicast 〈〈PREPARE,hi,d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to the primary node of every cluster
7: multicast 〈〈PROPOSE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 to all nodes of pi
8: upon receiving valid µ= 〈〈PREPARE,hi,d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 and r==pi(pj)
9: if r is not involved in any uncommitted request m′ where m and m′ intersect in some other platform pk
10: multicast 〈〈PROPOSE, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) , µ〉 to all nodes of pj
11: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) to all nodes
12: upon receiving valid 〈〈PROPOSE, hi, d〉σpi(pi) ,m〉 and r ∈ pi
13: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, d, r〉σr to all nodes
14: upon receiving valid 〈〈PROPOSE, hj , d, r〉σpi(pj) , µ〉 and r ∈ pj
15: multicast 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σr to all nodes
16: upon receiving valid matching 〈ACCEPT, hi, hj , d, r〉σr from local-majority of two-thirds of platforms
17: multicast 〈COMMIT, hi, hj , ..., hk, d, r〉σr to all nodes
18: upon receiving valid 〈COMMIT, hi, hj , ..., hk, d, r〉σr from local-majority of two-thirds of platforms
19: append the transaction block to the ledger
6.2.3 Global Consensus
The verification transactions include group signatures and all tokens that are consumed by different parti-
cipants to perform a particular task. In SEPAR and in order to enable all platforms to check constraints,
verification transactions are appended to the blockchains of all platforms. To do so, a Byzantine fault-tolerant
protocol is run among all nodes of every platform where the protocol needs agreement from the local ma-
jority of the nodes of two-thirds of the platforms. The local majority, similar to cross-platform consensus,
is defined based on the utilized consensus protocol within each platform. However, there are two main dif-
ferences between cross-platform consensus and global consensus. First, in cross-platform consensus only the
involved platforms participate, whereas, in global consensus, every platform verifies transactions by checking
the group signatures and consumed tokens. Second, cross-platform consensus requires agreement from every
platform, whereas, in global consensus, agreement from only two-thirds of platforms is needed. In fact, in
cross-platform consensus, there might be some dependency between cross-platform transactions and internal
ones, thus, to ensure data consistency, every involved platform must agree on the order of the cross-platform
transaction. However, in global consensus, the goal is to verify the correctness of the transaction and as soon
as two-thirds of platforms verify that (assuming at most one-third of platforms might behave maliciously),
the transaction can be appended to the blockchain ledger.
Algorithm 2 shows the normal case of global consensus in SEPAR where a Byzantine protocol is run among
all nodes of every platform (in contrast to cross-platform consensus where only the involved platforms
participate). The protocol, similar to cross-platform consensus, process a transaction in four phases of
prepare (lines 5-6), propose (lines 7-10), accept (lines 11-15), and commit (lines 16-19), however, each node
waits for matching accept and commit messages from the local majority of only two-thirds of the platforms
(as shown in lines 16 and 18).
Figure 7 presents the normal case operation of global consensus in SEPAR. Here all platforms include crash-
only nodes where f = 1 and the network consists of four platforms.
Similar to cross-consensus, global consensus also addresses primary failure and conflicting transactions in a
similar way as SharPer [3].
6.2.4 Correctness Arguments
A consensus protocol has to satisfy four main properties [9]: (1) agreement: every correct node must agree
on the same value (Lemma 3), (2) Validity (integrity): if a correct node commits a value, then the value
must have been proposed by some correct node (Lemma 4), (3) Consistency (total order): all correct nodes
commit the same value in the same order (Lemma 5), and (4) termination: eventually every node commits
some value (Lemma 6). The first three properties are known as safety and the termination property is known
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Figure 7: Global consensus in SEPAR
as liveness. In an asynchronous system, where nodes can fail, as shown by Fischer et al. [18], consensus has
no solution that is both safe and live. Therefore, SEPAR guarantees safety in an asynchronous network,
however, similar to most fault-tolerant protocols, deals with termination (liveness) only during periods of
synchrony using timers.
Lemma 3 (Agreement) If node r commits request m with sequence number h, no other correct node commits
request m′ (m 6= m′) with the same sequence number h.
The propose and accept phases of both cross-platform and global consensus protocols guarantee that correct
nodes agree on a total order of requests. Indeed, if the accepted(m,h, r) predicate where h = [hi, hj , ..., hk]
is true, then accepted(m′, h, q) is false for any non-faulty node q (including r = q) and any m′ such that
m 6= m′. This is true because (m,h, r) implies that accepted-localpj (m,hi, hj , r) is true for each involved
platform pj and a local majority (f + 1 crash-only or 2f + 1 Byzantine node) of platform pj have sent accept
(or propose) messages for requestm with sequence number hj . As a result, for accepted(m′, h, q) to be true, at
least one non-faulty nodes needs to have sent two conflicting accept messages with the same sequence number
but different message digest. This condition guarantees that first, a malicious primary cannot violate the
safety and second, at most one of the concurrent conflicting transactions, i.e., transactions that overlap in
at least one platform, can collect the required number of messages from each overlapping platform.
Lemma 4 (Validity) If a correct node r commits m, then m must have been proposed by some correct node
pi.
In the presence of crash-only nodes, validity is ensured since crash-only nodes do not send fictitious messages.
In the presence of Byzantine nodes, however, validity is guaranteed mainly based on standard cryptographic
assumptions about collision-resistant hashes, encryption, and signatures which the adversary cannot subvert
them. Since the request as well as all messages are signed and either the request or its digest is included
in each message (to prevent changes and alterations to any part of the message), and in each step 2f + 1
matching messages (from each Byzantine platform) are required, if a request is committed, the same request
must have been proposed earlier.
Lemma 5 (Consistency) Let Pµ denote the set of involved platforms for a request µ. For any two committed
requests m and m′ and any two nodes r1 and r2 such that r1 ∈ pi, r2 ∈ pj, and {pi, pj} ∈ Pm ∩ Pm′ , if m is
committed before m′ in r1, then m is committed before m′ in r2.
As mentioned in both cross-platform and global consensuses, once a node r1 of some platform pi receives
a propose message for some transaction m, if the node is involved in some other uncommitted transaction
m′ where m and m′ overlap, node r1 does not send an accept message for transaction m before m′ gets
committed. In this way, since committing request m requires accept messages from a local majority of every
(involved) platform, m cannot be committed until m′ is committed. As a result the order of committing
messages is the same in all involved platforms. It should be noted that in such a case we might face a
deadlock where different platforms might need to re-initiate their transactions after some predefined time.
To prevent any further deadlock, SEPAR define different waiting times for different platforms.
Lemma 6 (Termination) A request m issued by a correct client eventually completes.
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Figure 8: Varying the Number of Tokens
SEPAR deals with termination (liveness) only during periods of synchrony using timers. To do so, three
scenarios need to be addressed. If the primary is non-faulty and accept messages are non-conflicting, following
the normal case operation of the protocol, request m completes. If the primary is non-faulty, but accept
messages are conflicting, the request will be re-initiated. Finally, SEPAR includes a routine to handle
primary failures. SEPAR, as explained before, Handles conflicting messages and primary failures in a similar
way as SharPer [3].
7 Experimental Evaluations
In this section, we conduct several experiments to evaluate SEPAR. We have implemented a blockchain-
based multi-platform crowdworking system. For the purpose of this evaluation, and as explained earlier, we
do not focus on the description of tasks and contributions (both are modeled as arbitrary bitstrings). In
addition, certificate tokens, as explained earlier, are very similar to ((w, p, r), θ) tokens except for the private
part that has no significant impact on the performance and the number of interaction phases which is even
less than constraint tokens. Therefore, we only focus on constraint tokens in the experiments. To implement
group signatures, as discussed in Section 2, we use the protocol proposed in [11]. The experiments were
conducted on the Amazon EC2 platform. Each VM is c4.2xlarge instance with 8 vCPUs and 15GB RAM,
Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 processor clocked at 3.50 GHz. When reporting throughput measurements, we use an
increasing number of tasks submitted by requesters running on a single VM, until the end-to-end throughput
is saturated, and state the throughput and latency just below saturation.
7.1 Token Generation
In the first set of experiments, we measure the performance of token generation in SEPAR for different types
of constraints. We consider constraints with a single specified participant (e.g., ((w, ∗, ∗), θ)), two specified
participants (e.g., ((∗, p, r), θ)), and three specified participants (e.g., ((w, p, r), θ)). As shown in Figure 8(a),
SEPAR is able to generate tokens in linear time. SEPAR generates each token in 0.7ms, hence, generating
1 million tokens in 12 minutes. This is an acceptable amount of time since token generation is executed
periodically, e.g., every week or every month. Note that since tokens of different constraints can be generated
in parallel, SEPAR can easily parallelize the token generation routine in order to improve the throughput.
As can be seen in Figure 8(b), the type of constraints, i.e., the number of specified participants, also does not
affect the performance and the token generation throughput and latency is constant in terms of the number
of participant. However, it should be noted that a more complicated constraint, i.e., a constraint with more
specified participants, requires more tokens to be generated.
7.2 Impact of Cross-Platform Tasks
In the second set of experiments, we measure the performance of SEPAR for workloads with different
percentages of cross-platform tasks. We consider four different workloads with (1) no cross-platform tasks,
(2) 20% cross-platform tasks, (3) 80% cross-platform tasks, and (4) 100% cross-platform tasks. We also
assume that two (randomly chosen) platforms are involved in each cross-platform tasks and completion
of each task requires a contribution coming from a randomly chosen worker. The system includes four
platforms and each task has to satisfy two randomly chosen constraints. We consider two different networks
with crash-only and Byzantine nodes. When all nodes follow crash-only nodes, as presented in Figure 9(a),
SEPAR is able to process 8600 tasks with 400 ms latency before the end-to-end throughput is saturated (the
penultimate point), if all tasks are local. Note that even when all tasks are local, the verification transaction of
21
SEPAR: A Privacy-Preserving Blockchain-based Multi-Platform Crowdworking System
0 2 4 6 8
200
400
600
800
Throughput [ktasks/sec]
La
te
nc
y
[m
s]
0% cross-p 20% cross-p
80% cross-p 100% cross-p
(a) Crash-Only Nodes
0 2 4 6 8
200
400
600
800
Throughput [ktasks/sec]
La
te
nc
y
[m
s]
0% cross-p 20% cross-p
80% cross-p 100% cross-p
(b) Byzantine Nodes
Figure 9: Varying Number of Cross-Platform Tasks
each task still needs global consensus among all platforms. Increasing the percentage of cross-platform tasks
to 20%, reduces the overall throughput to 5800 ( 67%) with 400 ms latency since processing cross-platform
tasks requires cross-platform consensus. By increasing the percentage of cross-platform tasks to 80% and
then 100%, the throughput of SEPAR will reduce to 1900 and 700 with the same (400 ms) latency. This is
expected because when most tasks are cross-platform ones, more nodes are involved in processing a task and
more messages are exchanged. In addition, the possibility of parallel processing of tasks will be significantly
reduced. In the presence of Byzantine nodes, as shown in Figure 9(b), SEPAR demonstrates the similar
behavior as the previous case (crash-only nodes). When all tasks are local, SEPAR processes 7100 tasks
with 450 ms latency. Increasing the percentage of cross-platform tasks to 20% and 80% will reduce the
throughput to 4900 and 1700 tasks with the same (450 ms) latency respectively. Finally, when all tasks are
cross-platform, SEPAR is able to process 700 tasks with 450 ms latency.
7.3 Varying the Types of Constraints
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Figure 10: Varying the Type of Constraints
In the next set of experiments, we measure the performance of SEPAR with different types of constraints.
We consider four different scenarios where each task has to satisfy (1) no constraints (i.e., basic scenario),
(2) a one-specified constraint, (3) a two-specified constraint, and (4) a three-specified constraint. The
system consists of four platforms and the workload includes 90% intra- and 10% cross-platform tasks (the
typical settings in partitioned databases [34, 35]) where two (randomly chosen) platforms are involved in
each cross-platform tasks. As before, completion of each task requires a single contribution. To measure
the overhead of group signatures and tokens, we compare the results with the basic scenario where there is
no constraints in the system, thus, there is no need to exchange and validate tokens and signatures. When
nodes follow the crash failure model and the system has no constraints, as can be seen in Figure 10(a),
SEPAR is able to process 7000 tasks with 390 ms latency before the end-to-end throughput is saturated
(the penultimate point). Adding constraints to the tasks results in more phases of communication between
different participants to exchange tokens and signatures, however, SEPAR is still able to process 6200 tasks
(the penultimate point) with 450 ms latency (only 11% and 15% overhead in terms of the throughput and
latency respectively). The number of participants in each constraint, on the other hand, does not significantly
affect the performance of SEPAR. This is expected, because more participants results in only increasing the
number of (parallel) tokens and signature exchanges and the consensus protocols and other communication
phases are not affected. Similarly, in the presence of Byzantine nodes and as shown in Figure 10(b), SEPAR
is able to process 6140 tasks with 409 ms latency with no constraints and 5331 task (13% overhead) with
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467 ms (14% overhead) latency with one-specified constraint. As before, the number of participants does
not significantly affect the performance.
It should be noted that increasing the number of constraints, SEPAR still demonstrates similar performance
as shown in this experiment (increasing the number of participants in each constraints). Indeed, adding
more constraints results in adding more tokens and possibly more participants and signatures, however, it
does not affect the consensus protocols and other communication phases.
7.4 Varying the Number of Platforms
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In the last set of experiments, we measure the scalability of SEPAR in crowdsourcing systems with different
number of platforms. We measure the performance of SEPAR in networks including 1 to 5 platforms for
both crash-only and Byzantine nodes (assuming f = 1 in each platform). Each task has to satisfy on average
two randomly chosen constraints, two (randomly chosen) platforms are involved in each cross-platform tasks,
completion of each task requires a single contribution, and the workloads include 90% intra- and 10% cross-
platform tasks. Note that in the scenario with a single platform, all tasks are intra-platform. As shown in
Figure 11(a), in the presence of crash-only nodes, the performance of the system improves by adding more
platforms, e.g., with five platform, SEPAR processes 6600 tasks with 400 ms latency whereas in a single
platform setting, SEPAR processes 3300 task with the same latency. While adding more platforms improves
the performance of SEPAR, the relation between the increased number of platforms and the improved
throughput is non-linear (the number of platforms has been increased 5 times while the throughput doubled).
This is expected because adding more platforms while increases the possibility of parallel processing of local
tasks, makes the global consensus algorithm (which is needed for every single task) more expensive. In the
presence of Byzantine nodes, SEPAR demonstrates similar behavior, e.g., processes 5500 tasks with 470 ms
latency with 5 platforms.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce SEPAR, a multi-platform crowdworking system that enforces global regula-
tions in a privacy-preserving and transparent manner. SEPAR consists of two main components. First, a
token-based system that enables official institutions to express legal regulations in simple and unambiguous
terms, guarantees the satisfaction of global constraints by construction, and allows participants to prove to
external entities their involvement in crowdworking tasks, all in a privacy-preserving manner. Second, a
permissioned blockchain that provides transparency using distributed ledgers shared across multiple plat-
forms and enables collaboration among platforms through a suite of distributed consensus protocols. To
the best of our knowledge, SEPAR is the first to address the problem of enforcing global regulation over
multi-crowdworking platforms. We prove the privacy requirements of the token-based system as well as the
correctness of the consensus protocols and conduct an extensive experimental evaluation to measure the
performance and scalability of SEPAR.
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